Parties associated with the Copenhagen Accord have now submitted their quantified economy-wide emission targets and mitigation actions. These submissions are on the UNFCCC website. The US Climate Action Network has provided a useful table which summarises these submissions.

It is useful to have a ’schedule’ (such as the chapeau of the accord) in which as many emitters as possible list their targets and commitments. It is also useful to have conditional targets (along with conditions) placed into this schedule. If countries are able to commit to both conditional and unconditional targets, then we have a framework that could lead to countries choosing their targets cooperatively. This has been strongly suggested by research on mechanisms that implement public goods.

Unfortunately the way that these things are done in the accord is far too vague to work. It is hard to say what the accord’s targets imply in terms of actual emissions, because issues such as LULUCF accounting, international trading, carryover of Kyoto AAUs, and definitions of ‘business as usual’ are completely unspecified. Furthermore, the conditions that countries have specified for their conditional targets are completely vague, and it is impossible to be able to tell with much certainty from the accord schedule whether any of these conditions have been met. For example, the EU conditions use words like “comparable emission reductions” and “responsibilities and respective capabilities” without stating what these conditions actually mean.

A global framework for emission reductions should have an accounting framework that converts commitments into actual emissions. When countries make conditions for their commitments, these conditions should be based on this framework. Countries would then know what they would need to do in order for other countries to increase their level of ambition.

If a legally binding treaty is negotiated, it should be designed with these considerations in mind. Unfortunately progress on a legally binding agreement has been difficult: at Copenhagen, Tuvalu proposed to form a Contact Group to discuss legally binding agreements, but this was blocked by China, India, Saudi Arabia, and some other OPEC states.

Australian opposition leader Tony Abbott has launched a new climate policy. The plan states on page one:

Our policy will cost $3.2 billion over 4 years, while the ETS costs $40.6 billion over the first four years.

This is comparing oranges with apples. It is referring to the their policy spending $3.2 billion, and the ETS raising $40.6 billion from sale of permits (much of which will go back to households or polluters), but they are completely different things. And the “cost” of a policy is how much is spent on emission reductions, be it by firms, the government, or whatever. This has nothing to do with the amount of auction revenue in an ETS.

The Coalition does not appear to understand the difference between price and cost. Professor Ross Garnaut spelled out the difference at a public lecture at the ANU in November 2007:

Finally, it is worth differentiating between the price of carbon and its cost to the economy. The cost to the economy is not, as some have suggested, the carbon price set for emission permits. The “price” is not the cost – this has been a fallacy of the Australian discussion to date.

The cost to the economy is the expenditure on substitutes net of existing higher costs imposed through mandatory schemes. While carbon prices will rise over time, the cost of mitigation does not rise at the same rate. It could be more or less depending on expenditure on substitutes such as renewable energy development, increased costs of structural industry adjustment and improving energy efficiency.

But over time, the incremental cost of new energy sources applies to a smaller part of the economy; and continued technological and institutional improvement in supply of the new substitutes for the old high-carbon activities may bring down their cost, even when the carbon price is rising.

In a new low for the Australian media, today’s Syndey Morning Herald Online describes climate change skeptic/denier Christopher Monckton as a British Scientist. Christopher Monckton, also known as ‘Lord Monckton’ or ‘3rd Viscount Monckton of Brenchley’  does not have any science qualifications, nor has he published in peer reviewed scientific journals. He is, however, British, one thing the SMH subeditors did get right.

As well as not believing climate change science, he also told a US audience that at Copenhagen the US government will sign a treaty (which he has read) that will create a world government and “at last the communists who piled out of the Berlin Wall and into the environmental movement and took over Greenpeace so my friends who founded it left within a year, because they’d captured it; now the apotheosis is at hand. They are about to impose a communist world government on the world.”

While this makes for entertaining prose, this does not further anyone’s understanding of the climate debate, except to illustrate the lunacy of some of the opponents of action on climate change.

Monkton, who would be a nobody if he wasn’t such a lunatic, is getting a huge amount of media attention in the Australian media. At the same time, people who have expertise on climate change and its mitigation do not get a mention in the media. For example, Ross Garnaut, who put together a comprehensive report on climate policy for the Australian Government in 2008, gave a speech today. In it he made recommendations on what target the Australian Government should submit as part of the Copenhagen Accord, commented on the role of the UNFCCC, and described the proposal from the Greens for an interim carbon tax as a “politically practical way forward”. None of this has yet been mentioned in the Australian media, except for Carbon + Environment Daily, which is only available to people who pay $729 for an annual subscription.

Update: To its credit, The Sydney Morning Herald has since published Garnaut’s speech in its Tuesday edition. It has also updated the AAP article on Monckton with a more accurate headline (that no longer describes him as a scientist).

The Greens have proposed an interim carbon tax for Australia. The basic idea is that there would be a carbon tax of $20 for two years, and in that time, policy decisions on an ETS would be made. The details are here. Professor Garnaut made a similar proposal in the Garnaut Review.

This is a very sensible idea. A big issue with carbon pricing policy is that before a carbon price is introduced, there is a very strong incentive for polluters to act like the sky will fall in. This is because they know that would lead to weaker policy, or more compensation, or both. This creates a very bad environment for a government to make decisions about targets, especially about targets for the next ten years or longer. Introducing a carbon price first is a much wiser way to go about things.

This would probably be a good idea in the US as well. Getting climate legislation through the US Senate is very difficult, and will become more difficult now that the Republicans have an extra senator. It may be easier to introduce a low carbon tax now (possibly equal to the price floor in the proposed US legislation), and then introduce a cap on emissions later. Australian policy could show the way forward for US policy.

Good climate policy provides certainty for investors in low emission technology. When a cap is introduced, it could be possible to maintain the current price as a floor in carbon price.

In climate negotiations, issues of accountability and transparency are very important. If the leader of a country pledges to reduce their emissions by a certain amount by a certain year, then they should be held accountable to that pledge, and judged accordingly. If a country pledges to increase their emission reduction if other countries emission reductions add up to a certain amount, then they should be accountable for that, and there needs to be a transparant mechanism for tallying and adding up different countries emission reduction commitments.

But accountability and transparency are not just about emission reduction commitments. These issues are also important for the negotiations themselves. If in negotiations, a country waters down the strength of the agreement, or obstructs progress, then the rest of the world will judge that country, and arrive at their own conclusions about whether they were negotiating in good faith or not. The fact that the plenaries are televised online, and some contact groups are open to observers, helps to facilitate transparency on this issue.

In the interests of transparency, I will list below some of the things that happened during the negotiations that countries perhaps should be held accountable for. These include:

  • Russia’s on-again off-again emission reduction target;
  • Saudi Arabia, China, India, Venezuela, Algeria, Kuwait, Oman, Nigeria, and Ecuador blocking discussion on proposals for a legally binding agreement from Tuvalu, Australia, Japan, the United States and Costa-Rica.
  • Japan (supported by Russia and Canada) putting into question whether there would be a second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol;
  • the talks being suspended for 5-6 hours on Monday Dec 14 (when there was a lot of work to do);
  • the United States watering down the nature of commitments from developed countries at the final AWG-LCA plenary;
  • in the COP plenary that occured after the final AWG-LCA plenary, India proposed to delete collective emission reduction commitments by 2050 from the LCA text, as well as proposals to periodically review progress;
  • the (admittedly weak) Copenhagen Accord could only be ‘noted’ by the Conference of Parties, for the COP to do anything stronger (like adopt it) was blocked by Sudan, Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua – this was a highly acrimonius meeting;
  • a proposal from Tuvalu to discuss a legally binding treaty at COP 16 next year was blocked by China, India, and Saudi Arabia.

According to Google Trends. I guess it might have something to do with COP 15.

Amount of searches involving 'climate change'

There were three things that resulted from the talks in Copenhagen:

  • A 13 paragraph ‘political accord‘ was agreed by most of the parties, but could only be ‘noted’ by the COP because there was not consensus.
  • The negotiations on extending the Kyoto Protocol had unresolved issues, and the next meeting in Mexico will return to this. The key text that resulted from the Kyoto side of the negotiations is here.
  • The negotiations on long-term cooperative action also had unresolved issues, which the Mexico meeting will have to resolve. The key text that resulted from the long-term cooperative action (LCA) side of the negotiations is here.

What did not result from Copenhagen was a framework for developing a fair, ambitious and legally binding agreement. What was positive about the accord was a commitment on finance from developing countries, which would add up to $100 billion per year by 2020, but whether actual commitments will add up to this number is still unresolved.

While the the Kyoto and LCA negotiations did not result in a successful conclusion, the draft texts are now considerably shorter, and the unresolved issues are more obvious. Whether there is a successful outcome to the negotiations at a later date depends crucially on how these issues get resolved.

Some undecided issues related to the Kyoto Protocol include how land use, land use change, and forestry is accounted for; carry-over of permits from the first commitment period (hot air); the scale of the Annex I (developed country) commitments; and how these commitments are represented in a table, and the issue of base years and reference years (a less important issue, but the one that takes up most of the negotiators time). The most important unresolved issues for the LCA track are the precise nature of developing and developed country mitigation commitments and actions, and whether anything from the text will facilitate a legally binding agreement.

The final meeting of the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) was supposed to commence early in the evening on December 16. It instead commenced at 4.45 in the morning on December 15, after negotiations went through the night. The meeting was considering a new version of a text on long-term cooperative action that is to be considered by world leaders over the next few days. In this meeting, the United States delegate watered down the nature of any mitigation commitments that would be required from developed countries. The text that he is referring to (with the changes included) is here.

A fundamental problem with any international treaty is that for it to work it has to be ratified by its Parties, in this case including the United States Senate.

At an earlier meeting of the Conference of Parties, when discussing Tuvalu’s proposal for a fair, ambitious and legally binding deal, the Tuvalu negotiator made some eloquent remarks on the role of the US Senate in these negotiations, noting the irony that the fate of the world is in the hands of a few US Senators.

The talks at Copenhagen are not exactly what would be called a smooth operation…

This is an excerpt from a short meeting (slightly less than four minutes) of the CMP, this original video of this meeting is here.

Below is blogging from the KP track of the negotiations. New draft texts have been released to Parties, I haven’t been able to get hold them yet. A “stocktaking plenary” is about to commence. There was supposed to also be plenaries for the LCA track of negotiations this evening, not sure if that is happening or not.

Chair: we agreed we would establish a contact group for the sole purpose of fixing up the text. After this plenary we will work on the contact group. Time is of the essence, we hope to have something good to report to COP/MOP tomorrow.

Co-chair: contact group on numbers resumed. in this session we used various methodologies to try to get agreement, small informal consultations were particularly helpful. through consultations clarified c. periods – choice of 5 or 8 years. agreed to have single base year, not to have a common base year. discussed reference years. discussed surplus AAUs and LULUCF. This ensured numbers would be meaningful from environmental perspective. we have forwarded you an annex, which is bracketed, it is not a clean text. we did not discuss the ?? decision. two options option A consequential; option B go beyond, but fit under 3.9 of KP. need to return to reference periods. no agreement on how to express aggregeate figure and what it is, also on ‘top down vs bottom up’. much work remains to be done on other possible amendments.

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The Federated States of Micronesia, on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), has distributed among the contact group on ‘numbers’ a document titled ‘Potential effect of Surplus AAUs on Annex I allowed emissions in 2020: Technical Background and Assumptions’. It states:

Several economies in transition (EITs) have Kyoto first commitment period (KP.CP1) (2008-2012) targets that exceed their likely emissions for that period. Paragraph 13 of Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol permits that surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) from the first commitment period are carried forward to “subsequent commitment periods”. This leads to the situation where surplus AAUs are created and potentially available for transfer to other Parties where they may be used towards compliance with their obligations. As a result, surplus AAUs that are transferred to other Annex I Parties or carried forward will lead to more emissions to the atmosphere than would otherwise have happened.

The scale of surplus AAUs in the first commitment period is sufficient, if transferred to and used by other Annex I parties to meet their obligations, to permit Annex I as a group to emit as business as usual levels through 2020.

What the document is saying is that if Kyoto emission permits (AAUs) are carried over from the first (2008-2012) commitment period to the second commitment period, then the Kyoto Protocol will not have a significant impact on developed country emissions. In terms of emissions, this would be equivalent to not having a second commitment period, which is also a possibility (and has some support from Japan and Canada).

The document also has analysis of the impacts that each parties preference for accounting for land use, land use change, and forestry would have on emissions. It suggests that this would have a similar impact, but not quite as great as the impact of banking AAUs.

The EU has made similar statement on banking AAUs from the first commitment period, noting that banking could lead to an increase in emissions even if Annex I emissions added up to a 30% reduction (which they do not).

In an informal briefing to NGOs, an Australian negotiator did speak in favour of banking AAUs. I have not yet observed Australia saying anything on this in the negotiations.

This is the second meeting of the Contact Group on Further Annex I Emission Reductions today. At the first meeting, further meetings of the Kyoto Protocol contact groups were postponed for about 5-6 hours, in response to Africa and the G77 postponing negotiations on the LCA text.

A non-paper was distributed, containing the various options suggested by parties at the Dec 12 meeting. There were:

  • A: 3 options for tables for Annex B;
  • B: four options for article 3, paragraph 1 and paragraph 1 bis;
  • C: article 3, paragraph 1 ter;
  • D: article 3, paragraph 1 quater;
  • E: article 3, paragraph 1 quinquies;
  • F: article 3, paragraph 7 bis;
  • G: article 3, paragraph 9 bis;
  • H: article 4, paragraph 2 bis;
  • I: article 4, paragraph 3.

The text of the non-paper was put up on the screen, like with many of these contact groups, there is likely to be quite a bit of editing of the text during the meeting. Lots of squealing noises coming from the microphones…

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Climate Dilemma came in halfway through this meeting. Issues being discussed include banking, shares of proceeds for an adaptation fund.

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Official negotiations have resumed, it is 4.50pm Copenhagen time.

The main issue of interest discussed below is new gases, which may require ministers to resolve.

Chair: will proceed slowly to start. We had an informal consultation on wednesday. negotiating chairs report. two drafting groups, common metrics, guidelines. after chairs report, had possibility to work on that. want to agree on a final text. chair has added some preambular paragraphs, there are 6 of them. should be reasonably factual and non-controversial. check if there are any problems. if that is not the case, we have agreed on preabular stuff and go to substance. go to common metrics. NZ invited to facilitate the work. Par 2-7 of KP Chairs text.

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Chair: New text with other Annex I countries and US. Options for Article 3 par 1 and par 1 bis. option 1 reflects eu, option 3 reflects micronesia, option 4 reflects bolivia.

Australia: disappointed about not continuing LCA discussions. So we should suspend KP discussions. [LCA was blocked by some african states?]

Sweden: LULUCF discussions interrupted?

Jap: support australia

Peru: concern that we already had a day of delay.

Sweden: One group would prefer to have numbers discussion at ministerial level. Don’t know what is happening? Is there some disengagement?

Chair: LULUCF are interrupted.

MIcronesia: AOSIS wants to continue discussion on numbers.

Gambia: Africa would want to continue contact group on numbers.

Australia: unclear what is happening outside this room. Know there is plenary shortly. Very keen to discuss stuff. Disappointed that some work is interrupted. Given uncertainty need to stop at this point.

Chair: only have 20 minutes left, please make use of these minutes

South Africa: have already lest 1.5 days.

China: This is a core discussion. Unwillingness from Annex I to engage in discussions. Shoudl continue.

Sweden: agree with CHina that this is a central part of the work, but need LULUCF part.

India: support south africa and china. if we fail to come up with ambitious credible numbers, something I would not like to think about.

Saudi Arabia: support g77 and china.

Australia: repeat disappointment that some parties have stopped discussion in groups. “G77 and China has disagreed, and suspends participation in working groups”.

Russia: we have to stress that our main purpose is new regime. Support Australia.

Chair: close contact group. COme back at 7?

Bolivia: mentions 1.5 day delay.

??: finds this very unfair.

Chair: will convey messages to KP chair. no alternative but to close.

[Comment: there is a game of chicken going on, with different groups suspending discussions. G77 China, Africa (?) seem to have suspended LCA talks (until KP finishes).  Australia and the umbrella group have responded by suspending the talks of this contact group (and probably the other Kyoto talks)]

Korea: unfortunately secretariat unable to supply info about meetings.

Update: Earth Negotiations Bulletin reports that:

In the negotiations, substantive work on the long-term issues was suspended until late afternoon, pending consultations by the COP President on how to proceed. The need for such consultations arose due to “deadlock” between developing and developed countries: the African Group and LDCs, supported by the G-77/China, requested suspending all negotiations under the AWG-LCA. The move was repeated under the AWG-KP in all negotiating groups apart from the one focusing on Annex I parties’ further emission reductions. The EU, Australia and other developed countries participating in the AWG-KP, in turn, found this unacceptable.

Developing countries were ostensibly protesting against the arrangement whereby only AWG-LCA issues were to be discussed at the ministerial level and urged for more attention to be given to the AWG-KP. The issue was eventually resolved during closed consultations by the COP President in the main plenary, leading to an agreement to hold informal consultations on “crunch issues” under both negotiating tracks, headed by a minister from a developed and developing country. Many parties emerging from the meeting were heard wondering how work by the ministerial groups will be balanced against the more technical work by the various drafting groups, which is expected to continue in parallel with ministerial consultations. Nevertheless, work resumed under both negotiating tracks in the evening and the informal ministerial groups also began their work. Many drafting groups continued working late into the night.

The Contact Group on Annex I Parties Emission Reductions met at 6pm on Saturday December 12. Before this meeting was a meeting on mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, in which the chair was getting frustrated at countries inserting brackets into the Kyoto text and not really getting anywhere..

Co-chair: apologised for late start. other co-chair still in another meeting. After CMP, contact groups resumed their work. Part of understanding from informal was that we would work under chairs text. Start working on Annex to 3.9 Kyoto stuff. Please focus comments on chairs text and don’t insert everything.

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Earth Negotiations Bulletin has this to report on the Friday discussion of the Contact Group on Annex I Parties emission reductions:

ANNEX I EMISSION REDUCTIONS (AWG-KP): The group on Annex I emission reductions met in a late evening contact group. The UMBRELLA GROUP emphasized that work under the contact group could not continue until an informal consultation on the entire Chair’s draft text had been held with the AWG-KP Chair. Consultations with the AWG-KP Chair on his text were then scheduled for Saturday morning, and the meeting was suspended.

Several draft texts that could play a role in a possible treaty outcome have now been released. The first to appear was an early draft of a possible political agreement drafted by the Danish government in consultations with others. This was leaked to the Guardian earlier this week, and was opposed by the G77. It is probably not as bad as the Guardian article made out, and some of the claims in the article did not appear to be reflected in the actual text.

On Wednesday, there was a discussion in the COP plenary for an agenda item based on submissions 6 months ago from Tuvalu, Australia, the United States, Costa Rica and Japan. The main focus of the discussion was on Tuvalu’s proposal, which had strong legally binding emission reductions. This was supported by many small islands states, as well as countries from the Sahel. Tuvalu sought to establish a contact group to discuss this text, this was blocked by China, India, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Oman, Algeria, Botswana, Libya, Kuwait. A consensus is required to establish a contact group. The COP was then suspended. The next day the COP/MOP was suspended because a contact group to examine amendments to the Kyoto was also blocked.

Yesterday the chair of the ad-hoc working group on long term cooperative action (AWG-LCA) released a draft text. This is now being discussed by the COP.

The chair of the ad-hoc working group on further commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) also released a draft text.

Draft AWG-LCA text is here: lca chairs text – 11 dec[1]

Draft AWG-KP text is here: awgkpchairstext111209

Draft AOSIS text is here: 23989010-AOSIS-Proposal-for-KP-Survival-and-New-en-Protocol-Final

Draft Danish text is here: 23831690-091127copenhagen

A big issue in the Kyoto track of the negotiations is what happens with the excess allowances from the first commitment period (2008-2012). Estimates of the number of allowances are between 7-10 Gt CO2-e. In a presentation to the contact group on emission reductions for Annex I parties, the EU stated that they expect there to be 10 Gt CO2-e of excess allowances, and that even if the Annex I emission reductions were increased to a 30% reduction, carrying over the allowances would lead to an increase in emissions.

My understanding is that Australia supports carrying over permits. In particular, it is that countries take rules into account when making commitments, and we should exercise caution about revising those rules. The Marrakesh rules provide for carrying over allowances into future commitment periods and Australia does not support changing this rule.

In my opinion we should also exercise caution about an outcome that could lead to an increase in Annex I aggregate emissions. This would have direct risks for the climate, and risk causing problems in the rest of the negotiation process.

The contact group on numbers met yesterday evening. I did not make it, but the Earth Negotiations Bulletin did cover it. This is what they had to report:

ANNEX I EMISSION REDUCTIONS (AWG-KP): In the evening, the contact group on AWG-KP Annex I emission reductions convened. Co-Chair Leon Charles reported on the informal consultations, noting that on length and number of commitment periods, parties had identified domestic policy processes as a constraint as well as the importance of taking science into account.The FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA gave a presentation highlighting the need to cap the use of LULUCF and address the issue of surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). She noted that there are many ways to address AAUs, including requesting parties not to use them in the second commitment period, capping carryovers, and discounting. NEW ZEALAND suggested using actual emissions as a starting point for calculating quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs) as a means of eliminating surplus AAUs.

The EU and AUSTRALIA expressed concern that this rewards countries that overshoot first commitment period targets. BRAZIL said this would create more “hot air.” BANGLADESH, the FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA and EGYPT stressed a single starting point. NEW ZEALAND emphasized that the starting point with the greatest environmental benefit is from actual emissions.

The Secretariat will prepare a paper to capture the various options and clarify terms such as “base year” and “starting point.”

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